Article

Regional Integration in West Africa and Globalisation of Nigerian Direct Foreign Investments

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Introduction

After successive developmental strategies have not appreciably improved Africa's economic situation since the 1960s, a decade of independence, but indeed, have contributed to Africa's stagnation, African leaders, at the dawn of the 21st century, grasped the sobering fact that Africa's salvation lies not only on embarking on radical socio-economic transformation of their societies/economies but also adopting policies of collective self-reliance through economic and political integration.

This study examines regional economic integration in West Africa within the context of challenges of globalisation and argues that Nigerian enterprises should take advantage of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Capital, services annexed to the Treaty of Lagos, 1975 and Goods and frantic efforts at West African monetary integration and relocate their production facilities, among others, to the West African sub-region. The paper is divided into four parts. Part I examines the theory of economic integration, levels of integration, preconditions for successful integration and benefits of economic integration. With the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos as a point of departure, Part II evaluates the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African states within the context of globalization while Part III examines the options for Nigerian enterprises. The Conclusion then follows.

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I

That the movement towards new economic regionalism or regional economic blocs of the mid-1980s differed in many fundamental respects from regional movements of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and had had much greater significance for the world economy, there is no doubt at all. While earlier regional movements were limited to trade, and just a few areas,[2] the new economic regionalism is more global in scope, and involves integration of trade, finance and direct foreign investments.[3] Specifically, earlier initiatives towards the development of regional trade areas had been followed by a series of multilateral trade negotiations. Robert Gilpin has observed:

> The United States'… response to the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the subsequent creation of the European Community by initiating multilateral trade liberalization within the GATT; the Kennedy Round (1963-1967) of trade negotiations was a response by the United States to the creation of the European Community (Common Market) and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), a response to the first enlargement of that Community.[4]

To be sure, because of the goal of the movement toward regional integration in West Europe became not only political unification and a single unified market, and because of the "single market programme launched under the single European Act in 1985… would not only be creating the world's most populous, and wealthiest integrated market but also certainly, catapult the European Community into the position of global power",[5] it was small wonder then that the United States "followed Canada's lead and shifted its policy toward the development of a regional arrangement of its own: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)."[6] While "a united and possibly closed West European market" led to a globalisation of Japanese direct foreign investments;[7] Japan made strenuous efforts to create and lead a regional economy in Pacific Asia. Just as the developed market economies responded to regional integrative movements in North America and Western Europe,

> as more and more developing countries liberalized their economies unilaterally to achieve greater efficiency and abandoned import-substitution strategies in favour of a greater emphasis on export-led growth, they too began to perceive the advantages of regional initiatives that would promote economies of scale for their industries and provide some counterbalance to regionalization in Europe and in North America.[8]

While economic regionalism has become a universal phenomenon and obviously, economic regionalism has assumed quite diverse forms,[9] there is no doubt that each regional movement is an attempt to enhance its own bargaining position vis-a-vis other regions.

As a prelude to our understanding the West African experience at economic integration, let us examine the theory of economic integration, levels (integrations, pre-conditions for successful integration and benefits of economic integration. A review of literature of the types of economic integration (of national states) has invariably focused on the various stages of integration. Thus, integration, from its lowest to highest forms, has been said to progress through the freeing of trade barriers ('trade integration'), the liberalisation of factor movements ('factor integration'), the harmonisation of national economic policies ('policy integration') and the complete unification of these policies ('total integration').

These definitions have been criticized on the grounds that they conform to the principles of classical economic doctrines but are inapplicable to modern DMEs, characterized still by much State intervention in spite of Thatcherism, and much less inapplicable to LDCs and hitherto centrally-planned economies. With respect to LDCs, the relevance of the proposed sequencing from the "negative" measures of removing barriers to the "positive" measures of policy, coordination has been questioned by Hiroshi Kitamura who contends that

> in certain circumstances... integration may be accomplished to a considerable extent without lifting the existing barriers.[10]

While John Pinder agrees that coordination and harmonisation of policies is an important element of integration in modern DMEs, he defines

> economic integration as both the removal of discrimination as between the economic agents of the member countries, and the formation and application of coordinated and common policies on a sufficient scale to ensure that the economic and welfare objectives are fulfilled.[11]

Imre Vadja agrees with the need to consider policy coordination. To him, Pinder's definition of integration is too general and limiting himself to "trade integration." Vadja made a distinction between "market integration" and "production and development integration," defining "market integration" as "the guarantee of unhindered sale of each other's products within the framework of the social system of participating countries" while "production and development integration" involves *raising to an international level and programming the production of those branches of industries which... cannot be developed to an optimum size within national boundaries.*[12]

While the definition of "market integration" is qualified by the clause "as long as this is not obstructed by socio-political interests or excluded by common production agreements," the full statement on "production and development integration" refers to industries

> which, in view of their technological development, vertical integration, the size of their investments, and the shorter-than-average life of their capital equipment, cannot be developed to an optimum size within national boundaries without upsetting the internal equilibrium of the national economy.[13]

Undoubtedly, Vadja's distinction between "trade integration" through the removal of trade barriers, and integration through industrial programming on the regional level is meant to apply to DMEs, LDCs and hitherto centrally-planned economies. It is no longer in dispute that the integration of formerly self-contained economic areas into such larger economic entities as the European Union (EU) and NAFTA has been important in modern history. To be sure, the contemporary world has been characterised by integration of small but distinct territories not only into national economies surrounded by trade barriers but also into larger nation-states.

In spite of this process of economic integration, and in spite of the significance of the integration of national markets to the nature and evolution of the world economy, and indeed, while political scientists have shown much interest in political and economic integration for a relatively long time and though none had attempted to formulate general theories or explanations of regional integration,[14] few economists, prior to 1947, have written about regional economic integration or free trade areas, and invariably, they have been able to explain economic integration or free trade areas in terms of neo-institutionalism and the new political economy. First, neo-institutionalism which provides valuable insights but does not consider political reasons/rationale for regional arrangements, assumes that international/regional institutions are established to overcome market failures, solve coordination problems and/or eliminate other obstacles. Second, the new political economy explanation, emphasising interest group politics and distributive consequences of economic regionalism assumes that regional trade arrangements such as Customs Union and free trade agreements have significant redistributive consequences that are usually harmful to non-members and create losers and winners among Member-States. While economists frequently explain economic integration as a consequence of efforts of domestic interests to redistribute national income in their own favour; indeed, while this approach provides important insights into the domestic politics of economic integration, it fails to explain the costly efforts by Europeans to achieve economic integration.

The theory of economic integration combines elements of free trade with foreign trade protection. In an Economic Community, all restrictions (such as import tariffs between Member-States) are eliminated while Member-States, singly or collectively, impose these restrictions on imports from non-Member-States. Specifically, while an Economic Community establishes free trade among member-States, it imposes trade restrictions with non-Member-States.

The term "economic integration" means slightly different things depending on the extent of cooperation among Member-States which itself is a function of the level of commitment by the political leaders. That different levels of integration depend on the extent of cooperation and coordination in economic matters among Member-States is no longer in doubt. Basically, there are four levels of integration. First, is the free trade area, by far the loosest form of economic integration, with Member-States eliminating import duties on goods from other Member-States even though each Member-State is free to impose its own import duties (which may be different from those imposed by other Member-States) on imports from non-Member-States. Let us make some illustrations. If countries A, B and C form a free trade area, they undertake to eliminate duties on imports from one another, but are free to impose different duties on imports from a non Member-State such as D. With respect to the textiles industry, all import duties on textiles within a free trade area are eliminated but country A may decide to impose a 20 percent duty on textiles imports from non-member D; country B may impose a 25 percent duty on similar goods from country D while country C may impose a 30 percent duty on such imports. The defunct European Free Trade Area, organised as a counter-poise by the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community, was a good example of a free trade area. Consisting of the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Portugal, it collapsed with the membership by the United Kingdom of the European Economic Community. A modern-day free trade area is NAFTA. On the other hand, a Customs Union is a much higher level of economic integration than the free trade area with Member-States abolishing import duties on goods from other Member-States, but unlike the free trade area, all Member-States maintain common tariffs against non-Member-States. Thus, a Customs Union of countries A, B and C not only requires the elimination of duties on imports from Member-States but also enjoins each member-State to impose common tariffs on imports from non-Member-States. A Common Market is a much higher level of economic integration than the Customs Union. While a Common Market has all the properties of a Customs Union, it provides for mobility of labour and capital between Member-States. Finally, while an Economic Union is a much higher level of economic integration than a Common Market, it has all the features of a Common Market. Additionally, it entails the coordination and harmonisation of policies in such fields as industrialisation, monetary policy and exchange rate determination as well as economic planning.

More often than not, when examining economic integration, economists use the terms "trade creation" and "trade diversion." Specifically, trade creation occurs when the volume of trade with Member-States increases as a consequence of the elimination of trade restrictions between Member-States of an Economic Community. Thus, each Member-State imports goods from other Member-States producing them at lower, and hence, more efficient relative costs. Thus, the importing partner would produce less of such goods it produces at home and uses its resources for the production and export of goods it produces more efficiently than its partners. As a consequence, the volume of trade among Member-States expands. Put differently, trade creation occurs. However, trade diversion occurs in an Economic Community when Member-States reduce their importation of goods from lower-cost and more efficient countries that are non-Member-States and import such goods from higher-cost producers that are Member-States. Under certain conditions, trade diversion may result in lower welfare.

It is now in order to examine some preconditions for successful economic integration. First, trade among Member-States should be substantial. Put simply, the percentage of total trade represented by trade among Member-States should be substantial. Second, the more competitive the productive structure of Member-States, indeed, the more countries produce similar industrial goods within the Community, the more likely that the more efficient producers would capture the enlarged market at lower costs and with more efficient utilization of resources. Additionally, the more complementary the distribution of raw materials and minerals, the greater the scope for industrial coordination and cooperation among Member-States. Specifically Member-States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established by the Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975, satisfy this precondition. While almost all the countries in the sub-region produce textiles, soft drinks, processed goods and other light consumer goods, the even distribution of raw materials and minerals, as demonstrated by the production of crude oil petroleum in Nigeria, aluminium in Ghana, iron in Guinea, phosphates in Senegal, livestock in Burkina Faso and Mali, uranium in Nigeria, provides a good and favourable atmosphere for industrial cooperation which promotes trade among Member-States.

Undoubtedly, the larger the area constituting an Economic Community in terms of population, income, geography area, the greater the prospects of benefits accruing to Member-States. For example, the Single Market Programme under the Single European Act of 1985, obviously created the most populous, and perhaps, the wealthiest and world's largest integration market in consumer size (with a population of 355 million which is 130 million larger than that of the United States and more than 200 million greater than Japan's).[15] It was small wonder then that the United States Congressman and Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment, Sam

Gejdenson had warned in 1990 that without a long-term United States' strategy for dealing with Europe, the EU could "go the way of Japan," meaning larger trade deficits for the United States,[16] essentially, because the Maastricht Treaty, which consolidates past integration efforts, and sets ambitious new goals for *building* "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe," attempts to harmonise policies in such areas as environment, education, immigration and asylum, defence, foreign policy, agriculture, the fight against organized crime, control of drug trafficking, and monetary/financial management.[17]

Furthermore, for economic integration to benefit Member-States of a Community, national control and ownership of the various sectors of the economy should be secured before integration. Specifically, the more the economies of Member-States are controlled by foreign-owned companies, the less the benefits of integration accrue to nationals of Member-States and the more these benefits go to nationals of non-member-States in the form of profits, dividends and other factor payments. Some other pre-conditions for a successful economic integration permits an examination here. First, economic integration is likely to be more successful if such a Union is made up of countries of equal importance. Indeed, where one of the Member-States is far more developed than the other Member-states, as is Nigeria's position in the ECOWAS, the fear of domination may make the less-developed Member-States to leave the Community. Second, integration would tend to be more beneficial where Member-States are at "an exceedingly small industrial base consisting almost entirely of processing of natural resources products and small scale industries...." Third, economic integration stands a better chance of success if the size of each of the Member-States is not so large as to permit any of them independently to pursue a national programme on industrialisation as an alternative to cooperation with other Member-States of an Economic Community. Finally, integration has a better chance of success if it is supported by regional and other sources of assistance to support joint projects between Member-States.

Obviously, economic integration has some benefits for member states of an economic union. They have been discussed extensively in the economic development literature and will be stated here only briefly, bearing in mind that there is no consensus on every point regarding expected benefits. First, economic integration is expected to encourage specialization by permitting some of the domestic production to be replaced by intra-regional imports. With specialization, each part of the integrating region can focus its resources only on those goods and services for which it is best suited. This specialization implies better allocation of investment resources and improved production levels. The second benefit is the enlargement of the domestic market, which can lead to economies of scale. This point is particularly important if the market size grows with improvements in marketing, transportation and distribution structures, otherwise, investment costs per unit of output can increase disproportionately as the size of the output increases. Enlargement of the domestic market, together with intra-regional specialization, can also enhance the industrial bases of the member countries; and expansion of the industrial base has been viewed widely as leading to economic development. Thirdly, economic integration may permit countries to have access to resources that would not otherwise be available to them. It is still debatable whether the problem facing many African or West African countries is a lack of resources or failure to exploit adequately the available resources. However, countries that are predominantly agricultural can be expected to value economic arrangements that give them access to, for instance, oil and other highly valued mineral resources available in neighbouring countries.

Economic integration may also permit the joint production of public goods and thus reduce the burden that each member state has to bear in order to provide such goods to its citizens. The construction of extensive public road and railway systems, for instance, can be too costly for small countries with limited tax bases. With economic integration, however, partner states may jointly sponsor the building of such systems (i.e., through an intra-regional tax fund). Fifth, economic integration is expected to make each member state less vulnerable to adverse developments in the international market. This would be true even if protectionism were not involved, since at least for some goods and services, domestic populations would depend on intra-regional production rather than importation from outside the region. Moreover, the populations would be less dependent on the more expensive foreign currencies. The sixth benefit is not only economic but also political. It is expected that collective bargaining power will accrue to those member states that integrate economically. That power will be a result of monopoly rents, better access to the markets in industrialized countries, the pooling of import demand, increased voting power during international negotiations, and improved access to sources of foreign aid (since donors will save on costs if they negotiate with representatives of groups of states rather than with the representatives of each state separately).

This list is not exhaustive but adequately shows why African or West African leaders are eager to seek economic integration. It is political integration, however, that will guarantee that the continuation of those benefits will not be too closely tied to the whimsical will of incumbent politicians. Perhaps what Roy Blough and Jack N. Behram says of Latin America is also true of Africa: “the ultimate degree of (economic) integration requires a single, coordinated set of economic institutions and this would not be feasible without political unification as well”[20] Furthermore, political integration can lead to international peace by reducing the number of potential contestants in the political and military arenas. It can also lead to economic savings by reducing the number of standing armies on the continent or the sub-region and pooling security costs. In the social arena, political integration can be expected to neutralize the traditional points of social cleavage (such as tribalism) through the introduction of less entrenched points of cleavage. In Kenya, for instance, under normal circumstances, a Luo voter may be inclined strongly to vote against a Kikuyu candidate in a presidential race, primarily on tribal grounds; and in Uganda, a Langi may vote against a Muganda on similar grounds. Were the two countries to merge into one polity, however, a Luo having to choose between a Kikuyu and a Muganda for President may find tribal bigotry less relevant to his or her choice because that bigotry may have become neutralized by his loyalty to Kenya. Thus, political integration may be an effective way to eradicate long-held idiosyncrasies, in addition to being the best way to achieve economic integration and, ultimately, economic development.

II

It has been said that rather than continuing associating with groups of Western European Power such as EU, whose aims are at variance with theirs, African countries should endeavour to harmonise their economic, industrial and agricultural policies within the framework of an ECOWAS or an African Common Market leading to the establishment of an African Economic Community[20] This is the essence of the Lagos Plan of Action. At the July 1979 Monrovia Summit of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), African leaders adopted not only a Strategy for Africa's economic development, given income growth in African countries in the 1970s vis-à-vis other less-developed countries including the Newly-Industrialising Countries of South East Asia.[20] but also a Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and Measures for National and collective self-reliance in social and economic development for the establishment of a new international economic order.[20]

1. We specifically commit ourselves... to promote the economic and social development and integration of our economies with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-sufficiency and self-sustainment;
2. We commit ourselves... to promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse; and,
3. We commit ourselves... to establish national, sub-regional and regional institutions which will facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment.[22]

Therefore, African leaders at the Monrovia Summit took the position that the Monrovia Declaration

> will lead to the creation, at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, of a dynamic and interdependent African economy and will therefore pave the way for the eventual establishment of an African Common Market leading to an Africa Economic Community.[23]

Thus, at the April 28 - 29, 1980 Lagos Economic Summit, they lamented:
1. that successive global developmental strategies have not improved Africa's economic situation; and,
2. that such strategies had in fact contributed to Africa's stagnation.

As they put it, Africa has "become more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialised countries”.[24]

In advocating a policy of collective self-reliance, which entails a total restructuring of Africa's economic base, the Summit took the position:
1. that while Africa remains the least developed continent (it has twenty of the thirty-one less-developed countries of the world and per capita income stands at $166), Africa has immense human and natural resources: 97 percent of the world's reserves of chrome; 85 percent of platinum; 64 percent of manganese; 25 percent of uranium; 13 percent of copper 20 percent of the world's traded oil (excluding the United States and the Soviet Union); 70 percent of world's cocoa production; 50 percent of the world's palm produce; one-third of the world's coffee production; and considerable deposits of bauxite, nickel and lead;

2. that Africa is a victim of settler exploitation arising from colonialism, racism and apartheid; and,

3. that Africa was directly exploited during the colonial period and that exploitation has been carried out since 1960 through the instrumentalities of MNCs which seek to influence the economic policies and direction of African States;[25]

While believing that Africa has a resource base for future economic development, African leaders at the Lagos Economic Summit noted, with regret: (a) the structural weakness of African agriculture leading to insufficient agricultural growth especially of food production, serious food shortages and malnutrition necessitating large food imports and dependence on foreign grain supplies, and from an economic standpoint, considerable drain on scarce foreign exchange, and over-dependence of African economy on the export of basic raw materials and minerals, making African economies highly susceptible to external developments and with adverse effects on African interests.

What then is to be done? While recognising that Africa shall need assistance, direct foreign investments and technical assistance from all parts of the world, the Lagos Plan of Action, which African leaders earnestly recommended, insists on two guiding principles, namely, that these external contributions are supplements and not substitutes to Africa's exports; and that these contributions must be supplements, genuinely relevant and substantially

meaningful in terms of the purposes and programmes pursued by Member-States of the OAU. The Summit also declared as follows:
1. that Africa's huge resources must be applied principally to meet the needs and purposes of its people;
2. that while Africa's almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must change, Africa must map out its own development strategy based on a combination of Africa's considerable human, natural and technical resources to serve her people; and,
3. that Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance.[26] While recognising the importance of external assistance, Africans were convinced that "outside contributions should only supplement our own efforts," and should not be the mainstay of our Development.[27]

In extolling the virtues of *self-reliance,* African leaders were fortified by one important fact, namely, that not one of today's developed countries of the 'North' developed by depending excessively on external sources for the supply of strategic inputs into its process for generating and sustaining development and economic growth. They emphasised:
1. that Africa must mobilise her entire human and natural resources for her developmental needs and plans;
2. that each Member-State of the OAU must pursue all embracing socio-economic and cultural activities which will mobilise the strength of the country and ensure that the efforts expended and benefits derived from the development are equitably shared; and,
3. that efforts towards African economic integration must be pursued with renewed vigour and determination in order to create a continental framework for the much-needed economic cooperation for development based on collective self-reliance.

Three major elements of the Lagos Plan of Action are discernible: sectoral integration, regional economic integration and collective self-reliance. That an African Economic Community to be created by the year 2000 thanks to a six-stage timeframe and a Work Programme, an elaboration of which need not detain us here,[28] was seen by African leaders as an instrument for the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action can be seen from the directive of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, in cooperation with the Executive Secretary of ECA, to take appropriate measures, to implement the Plan and submit a Progress Report to the 1982 Session of the OAU Summit. To ensure the creation of the AEC, African leaders were of the opinion that activities of Member-States during the 1980s should be devoted to:
1. strengthening existing regional economic communities and establishing other economic groupings in other regions of Africa so as to cover the continent as a whole; thus, regional economic groupings such as the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and similar economic groupings in the northern, eastern and central parts of Africa should be strengthened;
2. strengthening, effectively, sectoral integration of the continental level, and particularly in the fields of agriculture, food, transport and communications, industry and energy; and,
3. promoting coordination and harmonisation among existing and future economic groupings for the gradual establishment of an African Common Market.[29]

To be sure, the aim of the AEC, like the ECOWAS, is to promote the development of Member-States; cooperation among Member-States and their integration in socio-economic and cultural fields. While advocating sectoral integration, entailing cooperation among Member-States to solve common basic problems associated with particular sectors of their economies, the Plan recognises two leading production sectors - food and agriculture, and industry. Specifically, the industrial sector is designed to make possible the supply of the bulk of industrial inputs required for agricultural production, processing, storage and transportation (agricultural chemicals, equipment, including implements and tools, building materials, food processing; equipment, transport equipment, etc.).

More significant, the industrial programme is designed to cover building materials, metal and engineering products, and chemicals which make considerable use of capital goods. Because of Africa's enormous energy resources and paradoxical dependence on energy imports with attendant dire consequences, the Plan advocates the development of science and technology as well as human resources relevant not only to the development of industry, agriculture, transport and communications (a major provider of services and a major market for outlets for the metals and engineering and energy industries) but also to the local evaluation, extraction and refining of natural resources which constitute the basis of all production. In essence, sectoral integration covers such strategic sectors as food and agriculture, (given Africa's heavy dependence on foreign grain imports), transport and communication and energy which would serve as the base of Africa's industrialisation. The 1990s was to usher in "harmonisation of strategies, policies and economic development plans" followed, as it was envisaged, by the establishment of an African Common Market.

On collective self-reliance, which seems to be the watchword of Third World leaders advocating a New International Economic Order, the Lagos Plan of Action advocated a restructuring of African economy. This entailed:

1. necessary changes in the composition of goods and services by gradually increasing the share of industrial products in the national and continental baskets of goods and services;

2. internationalising the sources of supply of such producer goods as capital equipment, spare parts and machines and raw material inputs;
3. continuous availability of managerial services for the exploitation of natural resources; the existence of efficient capacities for industrial and other forms of production; organisation and management; abilities to undertake project identification, analysis and implementation; availability of faculties for relevant education; capacity to undertake research and development; marketing, banking, shipping and financial services; and,
4. changing the pattern of external trade and ownership of enterprises between the public and private sectors as well as between domestic and alien ownership.[30]

Member-States of the OAU were enjoined to solve common basic problems associated with particular sectors of their economies, namely, food and agriculture, industry, transport and communication. African leaders also resolved that Africa should endeavour to apply its immense human and natural resources to its needs before exporting them to satisfy the wants of others. Africa, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government maintained, should cultivate the virtue of self-reliance because of recession and protectionism in the 1980s among the developed countries of the "North" had led them to reduce their linkages with the continent while changes in technologies and life-styles in the "North" have led to a drastic reduction in the demand for Africa's raw materials, major sources of foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, inward-looking development was inevitable. As the OAU/ECA Plan of Action recognises:

> . . . to believe that the drive-wheel of growth and development is the export of primary products to shrinking and changing world markets for such commodities. It now, however, recognises that the region's engine of growth and development must consist of a combination of Africa's considerable natural resources, it's entrepreneurial, managerial and technical resources, and its markets to serve the mass of its people, and that in this engine the development of capital goods is a major component. The region has no alternative today but to map out its own strategies and vigorously pursue their implementation[31)]

Given Third World experiences with the implementation of the Brandt Commission proposals for the improvement of the global economy, it seems obvious that African countries should stop believing that their salvation lies in the developed countries of the "North" coming to their rescue and adopt policies of collective and national self-reliance. To be sure, collective and national self-reliance is one of three major elements of the Lagos Plan of

Action. In several ways, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos constitute not only new ideas and concepts of development and growth but also new strategies of initiating and pursuing development and economic objectives. These strategies call not only for a radical restructuring of African economies; they also call for the mobilisation of Africa's immense human and natural resources in the pursuit of sectoral integration and regional economic integration.

Three years after the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted, a diagnosis of the African situation was unanimous and grim: the region is not only seriously affected by the burden of underdevelopment: Africa continues to resound with cries of distress. The realisation that Africa is under a new and dangerous form of balkanisation in terms of markets to dump the products of other regions and in terms of international power games that for Africa, there is no alternative to economic integration.

While the Lagos Plan of Action saw the 1980s as a decade for strengthening various regional economic groupings as well as the promotion, coordination and harmonisation of the plans, policies and laws of existing economic groupings, the 1990s was an era of consolidation leading to the establishment of an African Common Market. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 establishing the African Economic Community provides for the establishment of an Economic Community to include all the African States with existing and future regional economic communities as its building blocks. Though not explicitly stated, the Treaty envisages the eventual political union of Africa Thus, the AEC is declared as an integral part of the OAU. Unfortunately, events have not borne out the hopes of African leaders even after the establishment of the African Union. The hope that the AEU would be in a position to control and influence the trends of events in various RECs is misplaced because it is obvious that African leaders at various sub-regions need to integrate their economies before talking about African economic integration.

That Africa is richly endowed with strategic raw materials is one of several reasons why the developed market economies of the "North" will do anything and everything to keep Africa in their orbit. Fortuitously, the integration/incorporation of Africa into the capitalist economic order was and is decisive, wittingly or unwittingly, for Africa's underdevelopment. To be sure, in spite of Africa's rich resource endowment, a UNDP Study made startling observations about Africa's poor economic performance:

> ... The magnitude and expansion of poverty in Africa and the grave threat it poses to social, political and economic stability make it one of the biggest challenges facing the region. Africa comprises 32 of world's 48 least developed countries (LDCs), and 34 of the 45 lowest-ranked countries for human development...

> Recent estimates put the number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa at 250 million, which is around 45% of the region's population. And poverty continues to spread in Africa at an alarming rate because of virtual stagnation of per capita income growth (2.1% over 1991 - 95) and limited prospects for economic growth (4% on average, compared with 5.4% for developing countries for the decade 1997-2006 and 6%-7% for 2010 - 2020). Savings and investment ratio in Africa are the lowest of all the developing regions and the foreign debt burden is on average twice as high as gross national income, reaching four times export revenues in some areas.[31] (a)

The Study added:

> The human development challenges facing Sub-Saharan Africa are huge. Health and education indicators show severe deficiencies. Africa has the highest morbidity and mortality rates in the world. Health and nutrition standards have deteriorated and Africa is the continent worst hit by AIDS. Recent armed conflicts have caused terrible damage and destruction. With six million refugees, Africa accounts for *over half the world total. A further 20 million people are displaced within national borders.*[32]

It was small wonder then that African leaders adopted policies of collective self-reliance through economic and political integration, first, through the Abuja Treaty of 1991 establishing the AEC, as enunciated in the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos, with what success remains to be seen, and second, through the Constitutive Act of the African Union of July 11, 2000, thus, taking cues from their European counterparts under the Treaty of European Union.

There is really no need to make a case for African and indeed, West African economic integration, if only because economic integration represents the way out of underdevelopment to which Africa has been condemned by external forces and international power games. It is now in order to examine the challenges posed to West Africa economic integration by globalization not only because of the challenges and threats posed to Africa, indeed, the West African sub-region by globalisation nor because of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria admonished Africa to approach globalisation with caution though he was quick to embrace NEPAD, but also principally because the fifty-three "founding fathers" of the African Union were

> convinced of the need to accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African

> Economic Community in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more effectively the challenges posed by globalisation.

It has been said, and rightly too, that while there are many views on the subject matter of globalisation and responses to it,

> there is a unanimity of initial response by all nations to it -anxiety.[33]

Ambassador Lawrence O. C. Agubuzu of the African Union has noted:

> The launching of the African Union on July 9, 2002. ... was a momentous and seminal event ... in the evolution of the theory and practice of Pan Africanism and African Development .... Contemporary globalisation, propelled by neo-liberalism, is a major force shaping international relations and the politics of individual countries and regions of the world. It was for this reason that H. E. President Olusegun Obasanjo, while speaking... in Kingston, Jamaica, rightly admonished Africa to approach globalisation with caution[34]

Exactly what is meant by the term 'globalisation'? It has been noted that

> It is only an undiscerning mind that will see globalisation as it is presently contextuated as a mere 'spur of the moment.' The emerging trends tend to reveal that it is the last phase of a long-term that carry within its belly the embryo of imperial power or powers.[35]

What are these 'emerging trends'? The first strategy was the outflow of unguarded loans to LDCs with various conditionalities, with, a large proportion ending up in the foreign accounts of leaders of many LDCs.[36] Second, because the loans were not available to develop LDCs' economies, the little development achieved through internally-generated revenues was saddled with heavy debt servicing and structural adjustment programmes inspired by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[37] Third, were the unceasing pressures on governments of LDCs to devalue their currencies, followed by pressures on such governments to limit State involvement in the economy, removal of subsidies, privatisation of public enterprises[38] and liberalisation of the economy so that

> the agents of the super-States masquerading as multinational and transnational corporations could use local economic surrogates to buy up our heavily de-

> capitalised heritage which value has been subjected to excessive devaluation in the international market.[39]

Accordingly, globalisation has been referred to the

> liberalisation and the intensification of international linkages in trade, finance, markets, production, research, transportation, energy, medicine, education, politics, culture accelerated by discoveries in micro-electronics, information processing, communications and biotechnology.[40]

Globalisation connotes a presence, the process of "making global," "being present worldwide," or "global arena." These imply visibility, availability or immediacy. Specifically, an object, issue, value, institution or practice is globalised if through commerce, production, consumption, politics or information technology it is visible or considered relevant in global centres. Therefore, globalisation entails universalisation, whereby the objects, practices or values transcend geopolitical boundaries. Thus, we speak of a globalisation of human rights, sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and good governance.

The forces shaping our external environment have been variously identified as the globalisation process, economic liberalization and deregulation. The early 1990s witnessed reforms in the form of liberalization and deregulation, encompassing prudent economic policies, privatization of public enterprises and increasing acceptance of market forces in resource allocation. Thus, it has been argued that any country unwilling to accept liberalization and deregulation encompassing prudent economic policies, privatization of PUEs and increasing acceptance of market forces in resource allocation will be sidelined in the global flow of DFIs and trade which are powerful forces fuelling the growth of the global economy. Globalisation and liberalization, it is contended, stimulate economic development, which drives efficiency and innovation, and, in turn, optimizes the use of (scarce) resources.[41] In essence, globalisation

1. is driven by developments in computing and satellite technology with instant communication and information a fact of life around the globe and the consequences are disappearing geographical limitations for economic activities, capital movement, technology and goods;
2. involves the breaking down of national boundaries and entering the international business area for global competitiveness;
3. refers to the increasing inter-dependence of the countries of the world and integration of domestic economies with the world economy, and is manifested in the rising share of international trade in world output and capital mobility, thanks to the wave of economic liberalization; and,

4. is seen not only as part of the product of the tremendous advances on information technology on global relationships, bringing nearer a realization each day that the world is becoming a global village but also seen neatly as the result of the global extension of the highly competitive capitalist mode of production and the tremendous wealth-creating potentialities of its free-market economy- and concerned partly, with the heavy pressure which the capitalist mode of production wantonly puts on the environment, leading to the emerging global movement for "sustainable development."

Hence, the requirements of globalisation are: (1) promotion of high ethical standards, honesty, integrity, probity, transparency and accountability; (2) upholding the practice of international business ethics and integrity; (3) availability and effectiveness of infrastructural facilities - electricity, water supply, communication and transportation - which are grossly inadequate in LDCs; (4) cooperation among individuals and organizations; and, (5) conducive socio-economic and political environment.

True, it is that world trade has expanded phenomenally, since the 1970s, and some LDCs, especially the so-called Newly-Industrializing Countries of South East Asia (Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) have shared in the growth. Africa, which has no alternative to economic integration, given the proliferation of economic integrative schemes the world over, particularly the EU, some members of which are Africa's major trading partners, has continued to lag behind other LDCs. Specifically:

1. Africa's share of world trade fell from about 5 percent in 1980 to about 2.5 percent in 1993, and the slide has continued;
2. Africa's economic growth rates in recent years have been rather modest;
3. Africa's share of net in-flow of DFIs to LDCs has remained insignificant, just about an average of 5 percent between 1990- 1995;[42] and,
4. Intra-African trade has grown, largely, because of the re-admission of post-apartheid South Africa into the comity of nations.

Indeed, Africa had witnessed: (a) widespread stagnation; (b) decline in economic performance in some African countries from 1970s through 1990; (c) continuing rapid and unsustainable population growth; (d) heavy external debt burden - with no relief or respite insight; and (e) negative net - resource transfers from abroad.

African countries are being enjoined to embrace the forces of liberalization and globalisation. It seems to have been forgotten that by opening up their economies to foreign competition, when they are not on the same level of competitiveness with the developed market economies, that they are increasingly being integrated into a world economy and trade from whose growth they are being inadequately positioned to benefit meaningfully because they lack the ability to compete. African countries are Member-States of the World Trade Organization which succeeded GATT and under WTO's regime of trade liberalization, State Parties to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO are enjoined to allow unrestricted flow of goods, services and productive inputs, multiply the rewards that come with producing the best products, with the best design and at the best price.[43] Undoubtedly, export is a sine qua non to acceptability into the competitive global market. Regrettably, corruption (attributed, partly, to poverty among the population, and partly, to militocracy) and undue bureaucratic process militate against interests in export. Indeed, many African countries, particularly Nigeria, could not maximally explore areas of competitive advantage. Indeed, international competitiveness implies the ability to sustain a high level of economic and income growth having overcome the constraints of macro-economic instability, balance of payments difficulties, resource gap, infrastructure et cetera.

Have African countries overcome these constraints? That economic integrative schemes such as the EU and NAFTA remain groupings of distinct national economies, there is no doubt. While MNCs locate their units of production, banking and sales the world over, in terms of their ownership, control and management, they remain national enterprises as their owners and top management staff are part of particular national/sub-national ruling classes. With respect to the World Bank (IBRD) and the IMF, there is nothing global about their present shareholding, control, management, objectives and activities. They are multi-lateral financial institutions serving the interests of the United States, Western European countries and Japan, and certainly, they do not operate within "free market" parameters.[44] What is in fact taking place in the name of globalisation is the resurgence of the power of finance and financial transactions in the world economy - with the global networking of banks, stocks and commodity exchange, and financial centres with computers, telephone and satellites. Indeed, an efficient operationalisation of the resurgence has not only been accelerated by information/communication revolutions but also witnessed the concentration of financial power in a number of locations and its control in the hands of a narrow circle of financiers/associates/clients in a few countries with Wall Street and London directing most of the world's increasingly privatised capital flows.

To be sure, we cannot continue to talk about genuine liberalisation or liberalised global economy when the production and trade in armaments and crude oil are controlled by governments. First, one of the major centres for the production of crude oil and natural gas, with some of the world's largest reserves, the Persian Gulf, is under the direct military occupation of the United States, the largest world consumer of both commodities. Consequently, there is no global free market in these commodities. Secondly, there is no global free market in agricultural commodities, given huge subsidies provided by the United States, EU and Japan - which sustain the agricultural sector. Third, all the Exchanges (dealing with financial transactions) operate on the basis of currencies issued by governments with about 80 percent of the transactions carried out in United States dollar issued by the Federal Reserve Bank.

All LDCs, particularly African countries, mainly dependent on agricultural commodities, and mining, and the export of these commodities, are at the mercy of a few countries of the West who call in the tune in the name of "globalisation" and "liberalisation," and dictate the operating rules. No Western country practises anything near a truly free trade with the rest of the world:

1. movement of human labour across national boundaries, particularly from the "South" to the "North" has never been more restricted than it has become in the 1980s and 1990s - which witnessed the emergence of a Fortress Europe and Fortress North America - with the actual physical fortification of some of the borders -and plans to deport immigrants from parts of Western Europe, United States and Australia;

2. The enormous disparity between countries of the "South" (producing and dependent on the exports of agricultural products, minerals and other raw materials) and the "North" (who own and control the financial centres) has widened while the surplus created by the "South" from their productive activities which should be a crucial source of self-sustenance, self-generation and self-empowerment is drained away to the major financial centers and these have taken such forms as debt-trap[45] and unfavourable terms of trade inflicted on them by the dominant financial system;

3. The DMEs continue to institute a variety of hidden, non-tariff barriers to block more competitive exports from other countries. To be sure, if international trade was truly free, and if globalisation involves the breaking down of national boundaries and entering the international business arena for global competitiveness, low-cost and high-quality Asian clothing products and high-grade Asian rice should dominate most markets in the DMEs. It is small wonder then that the rapid expansion of Japanese DFIs in the EU and NAFTA in the 1980s and 1990s was motivated by the desires of Japanese

manufacturing MNCs to exploit fully the possibilities and advantages of EU and NAFTA;[46] and

4. Classical theory of free trade by Adam Smith and David Ricardo in which every trading company was expected to gain equally, thanks to the theory of comparative advantage has been completely obliterated by the rapid international mobility capital in today's world economy. Smith and Ricardo had based their theory on an assumption that capital especially finance capital would be immobile within the countries. The point to stress here is that DMEs move finance capital around the world to undermine and dominate LDCs' developmental efforts because they control close to 80 percent of world finance. Thus, an internationally integrated free trade regime, structurally, can never be a level-playing-field.

More significant, while the World Bank and IMF put pressures on governments of LDCs to privatise PUEs, withdraw State subsidies and rationalise their public services, ostensibly to make them more efficient, virtually all DMEs provide some significant measures of support for the public sector as well as provisioning for their societies. The warning by Herman Daly is apt: "I believe that this creed of globalisation through export-led growth, free trade and free capital mobility is long over-due for critical re-examination. It generates debt, inequality and environmental destruction faster than it satisfies the needs of the poor."[47]

III

We have argued that given Africa's precarious economic situation in the 1980s and 1390s, there is no. alternative to economic integration. The early 1990s, when African leaders signed the Abuja Treaty providing for the establishment of the AEG, witnessed reforms the world over in form of trade liberalisation and deregulation, encompassing prudent economic policies, privatisation of PUEs and increasing acceptance of market forces in resource allocation. We have argued that African countries cannot be enjoined to embrace the forces of liberalisation and globalisation because of they are not on the same level of competitiveness as the DMEs, principally, because international competitiveness implies the ability to sustain a high level of economic and income growth. Sussan Willet had warned that

> the current neo-liberal preoccupation with the benefits of globalisation which has been hailed as the great panacea for all the world's economic problems has done little for

> the 1.3 billion people whose economic circumstances have stagnated or deteriorated in poverty over the past ten years.[48]

She maintained that the new liberal models of development have all but replaced

> the developmental model that was widely utilised in the 1960s and 1970s and that still presides in a few States in East Asia... The tremendous developmental and security gains made by the highly interventionist East Asian States up to the 1997 financial crisis gave testimony to the efficacy of the developmental State model.[49]

She added, and this is very significant:

> Replacing previous models of state economic management with liberalised market ... and ... neo-liberal policies may have speeded up the integration of global market, but these policies have created a high polarized global market in which the rich have got richer and the poor have got poorer.[50]

Echoing her position were Hirst and Thompson who noted:

> The international economy is .... increasingly segmented into three powerful trading blocks, centred on North America, Western Europe and Japan, in which the State remains strong and highly regulatory. The benefits of ITC developments are concentrated in these already wealthy and powerful states to the exclusion of the rest of the world.[51]

Putting the matter more forcefully, Slater has this much to say: "the neoliberal order has in effect instituted a strategy of structural re-subordination of the 'South' to the 'North'."[52]

That globalisation promises so much for the world, albeit the world of DMEs, is not in doubt. But it promises little for Africa, indeed, West Africa sub-region. Lack of faith by the DMEs in trade liberalisation policies and DMEs' control of capital meant that Africa cannot effectively compete. For Africa to develop, it has been said, the forces of free market economy must be seen to favour all countries of the world.[53] Happily the transformation of the OAU to AU should be an effective way of rising to the challenges of globalisation "in a world that seems not to reckon with the continent," which Abdoulaye Bathily has admonished, must "hold fast to regionalism, harness its human and material resources, speak with one voice and negotiate with other regional groupings as one indivisible entity"[54]. He added, and this is very significant: "African countries must deliberately strengthen their civil societies, reinvent their polities in a way that will position it better to cater for the people.[55]

Exactly, what should Nigerian enterprises do in the circumstances? A major problem focusing many enterprises in LDCs, especially Nigeria, is political stability and security. While many LDCs have embraced democratization and demonstrated transparency in governance, what is obvious is that direct foreign investments will thrive best in countries that have infrastructural facilities, transparency in democratic governance, public accountability and zero tolerance for corruption. Poor infrastructural facilities militate against DFIs and increase the cost of doing business. Globalization meant greater integration and competition among all states. Thus, unless LDCs take complete measures to restructure their economies by boosting their exports, their share of world trade and exports would nose-dive and their per capita incomes would continue to decline.

That Nigeria has potentials for attracting DFIs not only because of resource endowment but also because of her population, there is no doubt. Because of poor infrastructural facilities such as energy deficiencies, massive public corruption, ethnic and sectarian violence, absence of public security and political stability, many Nigerian and foreign-owned enterprises especially those in the manufacturing food and (beverages), banking and telecommunications have relocated to the West African sub-region that is more friendly to DFIs than Nigeria. While we have witnessed the globalization of Nigerian DFIs in the West African sub-region such move has engendered anti-Nigerian feelings within the best host economies and this should not be, given the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Capital, Goods and Services and the 2001 protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of the ECOWAS.

Conclusion

The challenges of globalization to we have examined/West African economic integration argued that Nigerian enterprises should take advantage of the potentials offered by ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of capital, goods and services by establishing their subsidiaries in the West African sub-region particularly in the food, beverages and drinks, telecommunications and financial sectors.

Notes

1. The acronyms, EEC and EU mean the European Economic Community and European Union respectively.
2. *See* Adeoye A. Akinsanya, "The European Common Market and Africa," West African Journal of Sociology and Political Science, 1 (January 1976): 147-163.

3. See Akinsanya, "European Economic Integration and Direct Foreign Investments in Africa" in The Political Economy of Peace and Security in Africa, edited by L. Adele Jinadu (Harare: AAPS Books, 2000), pp. 240 - 279.
4. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, N, J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 342.
5. Akinsanya, "European Economic integration and Direct Foreign Investments in Africa," p. 240.
6. Gilpin, p. 342.
7. Akinsanya, "European Economic Integration and Globalisation of Japanese Direct Foreign Investments", Journal of International Relations 6 (July-June 1998-1999): 17-37.
8. Gilpin, p. 342.
9. On various types of regional integration, see Ali M. EI-Agraa, The Economics of the European Community (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994).
10. H. Kitamura, "Economic Theory and the Economic Integration of Underdeveloped Regions," in Latin American Economic Integration, edited by Miguel S. Wioczek (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 45.
11. John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration," The World Today (March 1968): 90.
12. Imre Vadja, "Integration, Economic Union and the National State," in Foreign Trade in a Planned Economy, edited by I. Vadja and M. Simai (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1971), p. 35.
13. Ibid.
14. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, The Political Integration of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Andrew Morovcsik, "Integration Theory," in Encyclopaedia of the European Union, edited by Desmond Dinan (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp 278-291;
Ernst Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," International Organization 12 (1958): 444 - 458; David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966); Karl W. Deutsch, "Communications Theory and Political Integration," in Integration of Political Communities. edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia PA: Lippincott, 1964); Haas, "The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory," Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Research Series No. 25, 1975; Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Hans J. Michelmann and Pannayotis J. Soldatos, European Integration: Theories and Approaches (Lanham, MD: University Press of America., 1994); Geoffrey Garrett and

George Tsebelis, "An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism," International Organization 50 (Spring 1996): 269-299.
15. See Akinsanya, "European Economic Integration and Direct Foreign Investments in Africa," pp. 240 243.
16. Ibid., p. 239.
17. Ibid.
18. See R. Blough and J.N. Berham, Problems of Regional Integration in Latin America: CED Supplementary Paper No.22 (New York: CED, 1968), p. 23.
19. See Layi Abegunrin and Adeoye Akinsanya, "Lagos Plan of Action Versus Brandt Commission Report: An Appraisal," in African Development, edited by Ralph I. Onwuka, et al. (Lawrenceville, VA.: Brunswick Publishing Co, 1985), pp. 7-7-78.
20. The Newly Industrialising Countries of South-East Asia are Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore.
21. See Adeoye Akinsanya and Arthur Davies, "Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: An Overview," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 33 (1984): 208-217; Akinsanya, "The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: International Protection of Economic Independence of Third World Countries," Egyptian Review of International Law 36 (1990): 51 -99.
22. See Organization of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980 - 2000 (Addis Ababa: Organisation of African Unity, 1980), pp. 5-6).
23. Ibid., p. 6.
24. Ibid, p. 5.
25. See Akinsanya, Multinationals in a Changing Environment: A Study of Business - Government Relations in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1984).
26. Organisation of African Unity, par. 14.
27 Ibid. par. 14 (iii).
28. Yinka Omorogbe, “Economic Integration in Africa,” in International Law and Development, edited by Yinka Omorogbe (Lagos: NSIL, 1998), Pp. 94-95, 104-106.
29. See Progress Report of the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on the Implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos to the Council of Ministers Thirty Ninth Ordinary Session, Tripoli. Libya Arab Jamahiriva. 26 July - 2 August 1982. E/ECA/CM. 9/1. 16 July 1982. p. 1.
30. Ibid., p. 3.
31. Organization of African Unity/Economic Commission for Africa, Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic

Development of Africa, First Africa Economic Summit, Lagos, 28 and 29 April 1980 (Addis Ababa: OAU/ECA, nda), p. 3.

31a. Mbaya Makwenda, **et,al**."Poverty Eradication: Where Stands Africa?," London Economist, 2000, p. 1.

32. Ibid., p. 2.

33. Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, Africa and Globalization: The Challenges of Cooperation and Linkages in the Twenty First Century. 1998 Annual Distinguished Lecture, Institute of Governance and Social Research, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, p. 14.

34. Lawrence O. C. Agubuzu, From the QAU to the AU: The Challenges of African Unity and Development in the Twenty First Century. Public Lecture, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, August 26, 2002, p. 2.

35. E. B. A. Agbaje, "Privatisation, Globalization and Public Administration in Nigeria: The Challenges of Change," Ago-lwoye Journal of Social and Behavioural Sciences 1 (2005).

36. See Akinsanya, "State Strategies Towards Nigerian and Foreign Business," in The Political Economy of Nigeria, edited by I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 145-185.

37. Adebayo O. Olukoshi, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy (Lagos JAD Publisher, 1991).

38. Akinsanya, "Public Policy, Privatisation and/or Commercialisation of Public Enterprises in Nigeria," in Essays in Policy and Administration, edited by C. C. C. Ikeji and E. M. Ekot (Lagos: Comsons and Texman Inc., 2002), pp. 276-302.

39. Agbaje, p. 3.

40. Babangida, p. 18.

41. For a contrary view, see Jibrin Ibrahim, "Notes on Globalisation and the Marginalisation of Africa," CODESIA BULLETIN 3 & 4 (2002): 3 - 7 ; Patrice Yengo, "Globalisation, New War Order and Perpetuation of Conflicts in Africa," Ibid., pp. 49 - 59; O. Ekanem, "Global Imperialism and Contemporary Globalisation Processes: Continuity and Change," Nigerian Journal of Social and Development Issues 3(January 2003): 139 - 154; Yash Tandon, "Globalisation and the South: the Logic of Exploitation," International Politics and Society 4 (1 997): 389-398.

42. Akinsanya "European Economic Integration and Direct Foreign Investments in Africa," pp. 262 - 275.

43. While the organized private sector in Nigeria supported globalisation, its spokesmen are quick to say that Nigeria's treaty obligations under the WTO Agreement should not be used to kill local manufacturing industries. See Ade Ogidan, "Operators Caution, List Pittffalls of Trade Liberalization," The Guardian (Lagos) July 30, 1999, p. 21.

44. See Akinsanya, "The World Bank and Expropriation Disputes in Africa," in Conflicts and New Departures in World Society, edited by V. Vornschier and P. Lengyel (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), pp. 129-158.
45. Olukoshi, Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990).
46. Akinsanya, "European Economic Integration and Globalisation of Japanese Direct Foreign Investments," pp. 17 - 37.
47. See B. Ogunseye, "Vision 2010: Photocopying Ideology." Sunday Concord (Lagos), Augusts, 1997.
48. Sussan Willet, "Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder," in Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development. IDS Bulletin 32 (April 2001).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. P. Hirst, and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 35.
52. D. Slater, "Other Context of the Globalisation: A Critical Geopolitics of North-South Relations," in Globalisation: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 38.
53. M. Mojeed, "Remembering Claude Ake", The Punch (Lagos), December 10, 2004, p. 54.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.